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Rethinking the Facial Takings Claim
In 1979, Santa Barbara County, California enacted a rent-control ordinance
to regulate the fees levied by owners of mobile home parks on their tenants.
Housing prices later climbed dramatically throughout the state, but due to the
ordinance "the rents charged by the Park Owners did not keep pace with this
increase."' Three co-owners of a mobile home park filed a lawsuit in federal
court that included a facial takings claim under the Fifth Amendment.' In
Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, decided last year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit accepted the facial takings claim and, reaching the merits,
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.3
The opinion endorsed the shaky proposition that there is a meaningful
difference between facial and as-applied regulatory takings claims. A facial
challenge alleges that the disputed law is "inherently unconstitutional,
regardless of factual circumstances of a particular case."4 In theory, the factual
situation of the specific plaintiff is irrelevant in a facial claim. In practice,
almost every takings challenge requires a fact-driven inquiry: to decide if a
government has "taken" private property, a court must ask whether the
challenged ordinance "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."'
This question is hard to answer without inquiring into particularized facts.
Indeed, the Guggenheim court used the fact-intensive framework established in
1. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F. 3d 996, 1002 (9 th Cit. 2009).
2. Id. at 999-
3. Id. at 1030.
4. Timothy Sandefur, The Timing of Facial Challenges, 43 AKRON L. REV. 51, 53 (2010) (citing
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
5. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City6 to assess the supposedly facial
takings claim.
The blurry distinction between facial and as-applied takings challenges is
problematic. Federal courts are more inclined to hear facial regulatory takings
claims thanks to more lenient ripeness rules.' Using the "facial" label, an
unhappy landowner can bring a federal lawsuit without waiting for the local
government to reach a final decision on how the regulation will actually affect
the plaintiffs property.9 And in one circuit the plaintiff does not even need to
exhaust all his state law claims before going to federal court.o
Most troubling, the Guggenheim decision is evidence that some federal
courts are willing to rule on the merits in these routine land disputes.
Unfortunately, federal courts are ill suited to adjudicate takings cases. With
most constitutional claims, if a court finds that a law violates the Constitution,
the court invalidates the offending portion of the statute. Takings claims,
however, have two steps: once the court determines that the government
effected a taking, the court then must decide the amount of money that
constitutes "just compensation" to the landowner." On the compensation
question, federal courts are at a clear comparative disadvantage relative to local
governments and state courts. Federal courts are often geographically distant
from the land at issue, and federal judges are not electorally accountable to
landowners." Not surprisingly, the federal courts historically have refused to
interfere with the land-use decisions of local governments or to second-guess
the rulings of state courts. This long-standing division of labor will be upended
if disgruntled landowners can skip local processes and move quickly to federal
courts with facial takings claims.
To avoid this result, this Comment urges the elimination of the facial
regulatory takings claim, with two narrow caveats." The federal courts should
only recognize as-applied regulatory takings challenges, a decision that would
6. 438 U.S. 104.
7. See infra Section I.B.
8. See infra Section I.C.
9. See, e.g., Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F. 3d 651, 655 (9 th Cir.
2003).
1o. See Asociaci6n de Subscripci6n Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio v.
Flores Galarza, 484 F. 3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2007).
n1. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
12. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, 1.
13. See infra Section II.C.
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force landowners to wait for the final decisions of local governments before
going to the courts. Because regulatory takings determinations are grounded in
facts, Part I argues that the as-applied label is more appropriate than a facial
designation. Part II explains how the just-compensation question distinguishes
facial takings claims from other facial challenges and why the answer is best
supplied by local governments and courts.
I. FACT-BASED INQUIRIES MASQUERADING AS "FACIAL" TAKINGS
CLAIMS
The distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is familiar to
students of constitutional law. The plaintiff who brings a facial challenge to the
validity of a law argues that the law cannot be enforced against anyone in a
constitutional manner." The as-applied plaintiff makes the narrower assertion
that the enforcement against him in particular violates the Constitution."s
Unlike a facial challenge, an as-applied case requires a factual inquiry into the
plaintiffs specific situation.
This distinction has collapsed with regard to takings claims. Facial takings
claims now appear to be as fact-reliant as the as-applied takings challenges.
This Part will discuss two recent developments that have, in effect, folded the
claims together: the Supreme Court's elimination of the "substantially
advances" test for takings and the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply Penn
Central to a facial taking claim. The logical extension of these rulings is to
consider all regulatory takings claims to be as-applied.
A. The Elimination of "Substantially Advances" as a Takings Test
For twenty-five years, plaintiffs had two independent ways to prove a facial
taking. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Supreme Court announced that a land
regulation "effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his
14. See Sandefur, supra note 4, at 53.
15. See id.
16. For two illustrative examples of the difference between facial and as-applied challenges, see
David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1333, 1335-36 (2oo5).
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land."17 The lower courts interpreted Agins to mean that proof of either element
is sufficient to support a takings finding.'
In 2005's Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., however, a unanimous Court
eliminated the "substantially advances" test announced in Agins.'9 The Court
explained that the question of whether a regulation "substantially advances" a
government interest too closely resembled a due process inquiryo that asked
whether the government acted arbitrarily or irrationally in enacting a law."
The Court decided that the "substantially advances" portion of Agins is "not a
takings [] test, and ... it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence."2
The demise of the "substantially advances" test should have doomed the
facial takings claim.2 ' To prove a taking under the truncated Agins test, the
plaintiff must show that the regulation prevents him from using his property
in an economically viable fashion. While some commentators still assume that
Agins applies to facial claims,' they fail to recognize that the Agins land-use test
requires the presentation of plaintiff-specific facts at trial. The "owner" must
demonstrate the regulation's effect on "his land."" Evaluating whether a
regulation "substantially advances" a legitimate state interest is a relatively easy
17. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
18. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) ("Agins' 'substantially advances'
language has been read to announce a stand-alone regulatory takings test that is wholly
independent of Penn Central or any other test."); see also Recreational Devs. of Phx., Inc. v.
City of Phx., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1099 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("As noted above, a facial takings
challenge can proceed on two theories: that the ordinance fails to substantially advance
legitimate state interests, or that it deprives the landowner of the economically viable use of
the land." (emphasis added)); Richardson v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 759 F. Supp. 1477,
1493 (D. Haw. 1991) ("An ordinance which does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests violates the takings clause.").
1g. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 542 (noting that the "substantially advances" test "has some logic in the context of
a due process challenge, for a regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental
objective may be so arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause").
22. Id. at 540.
23. See Daniel A. Jacobs, Indigestion from Eating Crow: The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. on the Future of Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 38 URB. LAW. 451, 485 (20o6) (footnote
omitted from title) (suggesting that Lingle "seems to indicate the death of facial challenges
under regulatory takings doctrine outside of per se takings").
24. See, e.g., Rebecca Lubens, The Social Obligation of Property Ownership: A Comparison of
German and U.S. Law, 24 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 389, 395 (2007); Michelle DaRosa,
Comment, When Are Affordable Housing Exactions an Unconstitutional Taking?, 43
WILLAMETTE L. REv. 453, 474 (2007).
25. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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exercise to conduct in the abstract. For instance, in 1996, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that an ordinance confining mobile homes to trailer parks
substantially advanced the legitimate interest of preventing a decline in
property values. The inquiry into the economic viability of the land, on the
other hand, demands factual evidence of the regulation's impact on the
aggrieved plaintiff.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Application ofPenn Central
The demise of the facial takings claim has continued with Guggenheim, in
which the Ninth Circuit concluded that "a facial challenge under Penn Central
must exist as a viable legal claim."2 7 In Penn Central, the Supreme Court crafted
a balancing test for regulatory takings claims that included three nonexhaustive
factors: "The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too,
is the character of the governmental action.",,8 The Court observed that in
previous takings cases it had engaged in "essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries.""
Despite the Court's emphasis on the factual nature of the Penn Central
framework, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the test could be applied to a
facial takings challenge. The court noted the importance of being "careful not
to simply look at 'the effect of the application of the regulation in specific
circumstances"'3o but instead to consider the rent-control ordinance's "general
scope and dominant features."" Nevertheless, in conducting the Penn Central
analysis, the Ninth Circuit relied upon "the core findings of the Quigley
26. See Tex. Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. City of Nederland, ioi F. 3 d 1095, 1105 (5th Cir.
1996).
27. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F.3 d 996, 1015 (9th Cir. 2009). But see Nissa Laughner &
Justin Brown, Cable Operators' Fifth Amendment Claims Applied to Digital Must-Carry, 58 FED.
CoMM. L.J. 281, 304 n.155 (20o6) (noting that Penn Central "may not be applicable to facial
challenges").
28. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation omitted).
29. Id.; see also Guggenheim, 582 F.3d at 1013 (describing "Penn Central's ad-hoc factual
inquiry"); Gregory M. Stein, Takings in the 21st Century: Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations After Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69 TENN. L. REv. 891, 928 (noting that the
Court has emphasized that "fact-specific land-use claims resist falling into patterns and
therefore must be treated on a case-by-case basis").
3o. Guggenheim, 582 F.3d at 1014 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2000)).
31. Id. at 1017.
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Report," which contained "evidence of the effect that the mere enactment of
the [ordinance] had on [the plaintiffs'] property." 2 In short, the court's Penn
Central discussion focused on how the ordinance impacted the plaintiffs
specifically."
The Penn Central framework does not fit neatly with a facial takings
challenge that, in theory, should not focus on a law's effect in "specific
circumstances."3 4 The investment-backed-expectations prong is particularly
difficult to assess at a general level because each owner brings a unique set of
expectations to his property purchase. In applying Penn Central anyway, the
Guggenheim court treated a facial challenge like an as-applied challenge.
C. Ripeness Rules Distinguish Facial and As-Applied Claims
However, one critical difference remains between facial and as-applied
claims: facial challenges are subject to less stringent ripeness rules, which
means that plaintiffs will be able to smuggle as-applied challenges into federal
courts under the guise of Penn Central facial claims. In Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank," the Supreme Court sought to
keep as-applied takings claims out of federal court by imposing two strict
ripeness requirements. A court should dismiss a claim as unripe if (1) the local
government has not reached a "final decision" on how the regulation affects the
plaintiffs property, and (2) the plaintiff has not sought compensation
through state procedures. 37
The general consensus among the circuit courts, however, is that facial
takings claims need not satisfy the final-decision prong of Williamson County.
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this exemption is warranted because "a facial
challenge by its nature does not involve a decision applying the statute or
32. Id.; see also id. at 1020 ("The Quigley Report estimated that the [ordinance] forced the Park
Owners to rent the entire Park at close to an 8o percent discount below the market rate.").
33. See, e.g., id. at 1023 ("The undisputed evidence shows that the mere enactment of the
[ordinance] has caused a significant economic loss for the Park Owners."); id. at 1023-27
(discussing the investment-backed expectations of the plaintiff park owners).
34. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773.
35. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
36. Id. at 186.
37. Id. at 194.
38. See, e.g., Asociaci6n de Subscripci6n Conjunta del Seguro de Responsabilidad Obligatorio v.
Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cit. 2007); Brubaker Amusement Co. v. United States,
304 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Thomas E. Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-
Nectow: A Procedural Loose End, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 623, 645 (2002).
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regulation"" - a characterization of facial takings challenges that this
Comment contests.40 Two circuits have also loosened the state-procedures
prong. The First Circuit has stated that a plaintiff need pursue his state
remedies only if the state provides "a process that is particularly aimed at
providing compensation when government action effects a taking," such as an
inverse condemnation action.4' The court stressed that "such procedures do not
include litigation of a state takings claim or any general remedial cause of
action under state law." 42 Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit held that the
Guggenheim plaintiffs could meet the state-remedies requirement without filing
an inverse condemnation claim,43 even though that cause of action was
specifically created to provide compensation for takings."
In practice, the relaxed ripeness rule means that federal courts will actually
have to reach the merits of some takings claims characterized as "facial." The
Ninth Circuit's finding for the plaintiffs in Guggenheim demonstrates that some
federal courts are willing to adjudicate local land-use disputes.4 ' However, the
next Part will argue that federal intervention in this field is a mistake. It
explains how takings claims, which include a just-compensation question,
differ from other constitutional questions. It then argues that the
compensation issue is best left to local governments and state courts, rather
than to federal courts.
39. Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651, 655 ( 9th Cir. 2003).
40. See supra Sections I.A-B.
41. Flores Galarza, 484 F.3d at 16 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 17. A statement from three judges following the panel decision suggested that the
decision "likely conflicts directly with binding Supreme Court authority and prior decisions
in this court, as well as the law in other circuits." Id. at 40 (statement of Boudin, C.J., Lynch
& Howard, JJ., respecting the denial of rehearing en banc) (footnotes omitted).
43. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 582 F. 3d 996, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009).
44. The Supreme Court has stated that a facial challenge is ripe the moment the regulation is
enacted-which would mean that neither prong applies-in cases such as Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1987), and Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992). However, those cases cited the "substantially advances"
test of Agins that the Court later abrogated. See supra Section I.A. It is unclear to what extent
those cases remain good law.
45. See Guggenheim, 582 F.3d at 1030.
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II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN EASY-ACCESS FACIAL TAKINGS
CLAIM
A. The Compensation Question Distinguishes Facial Takings Claims
The remedy for a facial taking is very different from that for most other
facial challenges. As noted earlier, if a court finds that a law is unconstitutional
on its face, "[t]he proper remedy . . . is typically not compensation but an
injunction against enforcement and a declaration that the law is invalid."6 In
sharp contrast, "a facial takings claim is not an argument for invalidity per se"
because the Fifth Amendment allows takings as long as the government
provides just compensation." If a court does find that a regulation constitutes a
taking on its face, the next step is not invalidation but rather determination of
the appropriate compensation that should be given to the plaintiff. A federal
court-removed from the disputed property, unaccountable to the local
landowners, and inexperienced with takings cases--is not in the ideal
position to decide a land-value question. The Supreme Court has stated that
"state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal courts do in
resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning
and land-use regulations." 49
B. Facial Takings Claims Undermine the Traditional Power ofLocal
Governments
The remedy for a facial taking requires local knowledge, and the proper
amount of compensation should be the decision of the local government in the
first instance. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the "regulation of land
use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments."s0 Local
governments have always had wide authority to set land-use policies and
46. Sandefur, supra note 4, at 61.
47. Id. at 63.
48. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S. F., 545 U.S. 323, 347 (2005) ("[T]here is scant
precedent for the litigation in federal district court of [takings] claims that a state agency has
taken property in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.").
49. Id.; see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203, 243 (2004) (noting that Supreme Court precedent has "locate[d] primary
authority for resolving takings claims in the state courts").
5o. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994); see also FERC v.
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regulations." After the local government exercises its eminent domain power, it
deserves the opportunity to offer fair payment without worrying about the
credible threat of federal intervention.52
The facial takings claim is a cause for concern because it can be used to
undercut the local government's land-use powers. The exemption of the facial
claim from the Williamson County final-decision prong means that a
disgruntled landowner can bring an action in federal court without first using
the political channels. Even the threat of a federal lawsuit could alter the
behavior of local officials, turning the traditional power balance on its head.
The availability of federal court as an option would also undermine the
customary process of bargaining and horse trading that occurs between the
government and the landowner." The ripeness prong reinforced this tradition
of haggling with the government. In fact, in Williamson County, the Supreme
Court decided that the takings claim was not ripe because the plaintiff had not
applied for a variance from the municipal officials. 4 However, with the facial
takings claim, landowners no longer have to spend time negotiating with the
local government.
As a result, the facial takings claim will likely give individual landowners
too much control over land-use policy. This additional power is unnecessary
because checks are already built into the system to restrain the local
government from consistently making bad-faith compensation offers. For
instance, the local government can be held accountable through elections.
People care a great deal about property values in the community." Politicians
who consistently undervalue property taken by the government would face
backlash. Moreover, one scholar argues that governments usually
overcompensate the owners of taken property. 6 The political processes protect
51. See Rogin v. Bensalem Twp., 616 F.2d 68o, 698 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he Supreme Court
affords state and local governments broad latitude in [land use]. Implicit in this deference is
the recognition . . . that local political bodies are better able than federal courts to assess the
benefits and burdens of such legislation.").
52. See Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 46 (ist Cir. 1992)
(expressing the belief that federal courts should not "sit as a 'zoning board of appeals"' or
"involve them[selves] in political disputes better left to local governments" (quoting Vill. of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
53. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON &VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 304
(3d ed. 2005).
54. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 188-89
(1985).
55. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 53, at 305.
56. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH.
L. REV. 101, 121-31 (2006).
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landowners from arbitrary seizures and unjust compensation; the federal
courts should not intrude into this realm, especially in light of the expertise of
state courts in local land disputes.
C. What Role for the Federal Courts?
This Comment recognizes that elected local governments and courts once
openly oppressed minorities and other vulnerable groups." Some scholars view
the federal courts as "providing a fair and unbiased forum-insulated from
local majoritarian pressure and elected state court judges"s, and have come out
strongly in favor of a federal forum for takings claims." As discussed above,
federal courts are not designed to be the courts of first resort for takings issues.
This observation does not, however, suggest that the federal courts should be
completely divested of any role in land-use cases. Instead, those courts should
be used as a backstop to guard against failure at the local level.
In fact, plaintiffs currently have several ways to access the federal courts. A
landowner who satisfies the two ripeness requirements of Williamson County is
free to bring his claim to federal court. A plaintiff can also challenge a
regulation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than the Takings Clause. Judge Richard Posner has pointed out that the
Takings Clause cannot possibly be the exclusive remedy for an infringement of
property rights because, "pushed to its logical extreme, the argument would
read 'property' out of the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
57. See Sterk, supra note 49, at 236.
58. J. David Breemer, You Can Check Out but You Can Never Leave: The Story of San Remo
Hotel -The Supreme Court Relegates Federal Takings Claims to State Courts Under a Rule
Intended To Ripen the Claims for Federal Review, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 247, 290 (20o6).
59. See Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness
and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73, 74 (1988)
(arguing for a federal forum for takings claims raised against actions taken under color of
state law because of state courts' "'inherent potential for bias"' against claimants in such
cases (quoting Paul Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1352, 1358
(1970))); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of
Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go To Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases,
1o J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 92-93 (1994) (arguing that "[i]t is extremely important that
property owners have access to federal courts" because "[a]n almost certain prejudice is
created by having an elected or appointed state judge, sitting in the same local area as the
alleged taking, decide the case"). But see Sterk, supra note 49, at 236 ("[T]here would appear
to be little institutional reason to conclude that state courts are poorly situated to police
political process failures in the takings area.").
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Amendments." 6 In the same vein, one legal commentator has noted that an
unhappy landowner can file "an offensive action to enjoin the government
from taking private property," including a § 1983 lawsuit and a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim.
Finally, there are two situations in which a facial challenge is not only
possible but potentially desirable: per se takings and one hundred percent
diminutions of value. This Comment's argument against facial takings
challenges does not apply to either situation. Per se takings result from
regulations that produce physical invasion and occupation of private property;
in these cases, the Court "has invariably found a taking."" And if a regulation
results in a one hundred percent diminution in value, the categorical rule is
that the landowner recovers the full land value." The common thread here is
that, in both situations, the disputed regulation has a uniform impact on all
landowners and just compensation can be more easily calculated without
resorting to the specifics of each piece of property.
CONCLUSION
The facial regulatory takings claim is a vestige of the pre-Lingle takings
jurisprudence, which allowed a plaintiff to show that a land-use regulation did
not "substantially advance" a legitimate government interest. Facial takings
challenges are now heavily fact-driven, much like as-applied takings
challenges. The Guggenheim court advanced the merger even further by using
the fact-based Penn Central framework to assess a facial takings claim.
However, courts continue to distinguish between facial and as-applied takings
claims, and the consequences will be the sapping of local government power
and the undercutting of state courts. To prevent these negative effects, courts
should eliminate the facial takings claim.
DAVID ZHOU
6o. Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988). In the same
opinion, Judge Posner expressed skepticism about invalidating regulations based on the
doctrine of substantive due process, which "invests judges with an uncanalized discretion to
invalidate federal and state legislation." Id. at 465. However, violations of procedural due
process rights - including notice and opportunity to be heard -might prove to be more
successful grounds for lawsuits. See D. Zachary Hudson, Note, Eminent Domain Due Process,
119 YALE L.J. 128o (2010).
61. Hudson, supra note 6o, at 1297; see id. at 1298, 1303.
62. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982).
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